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LEGAL INSECURITY AND LAND CONFLICTS IN 
MGETA, ULUGURU MOUNTAINS, TANZANIA 
Jan Kees van Donge 
It is not surprising that land disputes erupt if land becomes scarce, as is the 
case in the Mgeta division in the Uluguru mountains, Morogoro rural 
district, Tanzania. The Uluguru mountains rise up steeply behind the town 
of Morogoro, about 200 km inland from Dar es Salaam, the main city in the 
country. Pressure of population on land, made more severe by erosion and 
land exhaustion, is a main feature of life. Agriculture is, increasingly, a 
reserve activity and few people can make a living in the area without being 
dependent upon remittances from outside (van Donge, 1992). Despite the 
decreasing economic importance of agriculture, in the words of the district 
magistrate of Morogoro: 'People in Mgeta always have quarrelled and 
always will quarrel endlessly about tiny pieces of land of little value.' The 
idea of a 'reasonable' Luguru land litigant, analogous to Gluckman's des- 
cription of the Lozi litigant (Gluckman, 1954), is absent in this perception, 
as conflict is seen as being propelled without reason. People in Mgeta 
consider a land dispute to be one of the great tragedies that can befall them. 
Land disputes entail great costs and effort, yet people in Mgeta become 
deeply involved in such cases. Conflicts can be taken as far as the highest 
judicial organs of the country. 
This article aims to explain why people become entangled in such situa- 
tions, which seem not to serve the self-interest of the parties involved. For 
example: if land conflicts were settled in semi-autonomous fields outside 
the state legal arena (Moore, 1978), great cost and effort would be saved.' 
The possibilities exist in Mgeta for conflicts to be settled in such ways, yet, 
for everyone, the risk of being dragged into cases in the state legal arena is 
very great. The working of the state legal system is not the central focus of 
analysis here, but it is an essential aspect of the cases described. As will 
become clear, the courts resort to a great number of procedural devices to 
procrastinate and avoid coming to a decision. If a decision is reached, then 
the courts do not usually make judgements on legal principles relevant to 
the substantive issues of law involved but treat each case in isolation. The 
state legal system is an arbitrary social universe to enter (van Donge, 
forthcoming). This often frantic search for justice does not lead to binding 
decisions which clarify future situations. According to popular wisdom in 
Mgeta, the outcome of a land case is often the depletion of the resources of 
all parties involved. People locked in these disputes feel themselves prison- 
ers of a process from which they cannot escape. The question as to why 
people nevertheless become involved in them is thus a vexing one. 
The main point to be made here is that this situation is caused by a 
breakdown in the social construction of reality. 'All reality is subject to 
social definition, and all social definition of reality has its legal aspect' (von 
Benda-Beckmann, 1979: 385). The interpretation of new situations with 
legal principles is often inherent in the application of law. An abstract set 
of principles can never foresee the situations that will emerge in the process 
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of social change, and interpretation is therefore needed. In order for this 
social definition of reality to become law, these interpretations have to be 
formulated-to a minimal degree-in an authoritatively binding way. 
Authoritatively binding interpretations can be made by recognised author- 
ity or by a process of group consensus. This article describes why there is 
a need for such social definition with respect to land law in Mgeta and how 
society there fails to produce such definitions in an authoritatively binding 
form. 
The issue here is not a normative one. The question is not 'What decision 
should the courts have reached, given a set of legal rules?' On the contrary, 
the article aims to show that this is not a relevant question, as it assumes 
that law is an ahistorical product. Legal norm complexes are not relatively 
independent of the particular time and place in which they are applied but, 
rather, are social constructions which are continually adapted and 
developed. The perspective on the formation of law is from below: why do 
legal issues emerge and develop into such overwhelming social phenomena 
as is the case in Mgeta? A discussion as to what the national law is or how 
it interacts with local legal systems is not relevant here, because national law 
does not impinge on life in Mgeta and the local legal system is not a fixed 
but a fluid entity. These land conflicts cannot, therefore, be explained in 
terms of struggle between particular norm complexes, e.g. local law versus 
state law or communal versus individual tenure. Such elements are inex- 
tricably intertwined in social practice, and it will be evident that adherence 
to a particular norm complex does not alleviate the need for social definition 
of reality as it arises in actuality. 
LUGURU IDEAS ON LAND TENURE 
Luguru land tenure has been described by Fosbrooke and Young (1960) 
and Brain (1973), and the normative system they described was still ad- 
hered to in the late 1980s. Luguru life is described by them as structured 
by matrilineal descent in terms of clans and lineages. Lineages, and to a 
lesser extent clans, trace a common descent from the original settler of an 
area. The identity of a Mluguru is established through identification with 
such clans: this identification implies a right to live on and work land. 
Any Mluguru will answer when asked about land tenure, 'Sisi tunafuata 
mama' (We follow the mother). Land in this ideology is inherited in the 
female line and held by a corporate entity: the matrilineal clan. The clans 
are exogamous and therefore an individual's clan identity derives from 
his/her mother. Unless land is sold, the ownership of land is inalienable 
from clans. Under certain circumstances the ideology allows people to farm 
land even though they have a different clan identity from the land. Ideally, 
land is inherited in the female line, but the ideology allows a son to inherit 
land from his mother. The identity of the land and of the person who works 
the land remains the same in this instance, because the son inherits his clan 
identity from his mother. The son's children, the grandchildren of the 
mother from whom the land originates, may also inherit the land from their 
father-this despite the fact that their clan identity is different from that of 
the land they work: the land originates from their father but they get their 
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TABLE 1 Mgeta division household survey: stated claims to land owned 
Nature of claim No. of plots (%) 
Clan-based claims 
Women from mother's side 508 (48) 
Men from mother's side 255 (24) 
Women from father's side 121 (11) 
Men from father's side 70 (7) 
Outside clan relations 
Borrowed/rented 34 (3) 
Bought/started themselves 69 (7) 
Total 1,057 
clan identity from their mother. When these grandchildren die, however, 
the land should revert to the clan from which it originated and cannot be 
passed on to the children of the grandchildren currently working it. 
People in Mgeta reason about and interpret land conflicts in terms of clan 
ownership and kinship. Table 1 shows the legitimisation of land ownership 
in a household survey of nine neighbourhoods in Mgeta.2 It appears that 
only 10 per cent of all plots were claimed on grounds other than clan 
ownership and only 7 per cent of all plots were claimed on an individual 
title. The majority of all claims on land were based on direct matrilineal 
descent (72 per cent). In the mid-1980s people continued thus to defend 
land ownership mainly in terms of matrilineal descent, but two institutions 
which are central in earlier accounts had lost meaning. Fosbrooke and 
Young (1960) mention a whole terminology surrounding the concept of 
lineage. This terminology elicited no response among informants. People 
merely reasoned in terms of the very wide clan (ukoo) or in terms of direct 
descent (kuhusiana). As will be made clear below, groups of people in 
dispute can often not even be classified in terms of a lineage, but may be 
better classified as action sets. Fosbrooke and Young (1960), as well as 
Brain (1973), describe the lineage head as the source of authority in matters 
of corporately owned land. By the time of the present study the institution 
of lineage head had disappeared.3 The disappearance of the idea of lineage 
and lineage head probably indicates individualisation in society (van 
Donge, 1992). Old social structures may thus lose a meaning they once had, 
but matrilineal descent and corporate claims on land remain a powerful 
social force. 
Social change may have weakened the conforming force of social struc- 
ture. It may also be that the earlier studies (Fosbrooke and Young, 1960; 
Brain, 1973) reified social structure. Theirs is a structural approach, which 
pays little attention to the way kinship is manipulated in social affairs 
(kinship in action). Holy (1976) and Kuper (1982) have suggested that the 
concepts of the lineage and the clan as corporate groups may be more a 
construction of anthropologists looking for a logic of descent than actual 
observable entities. Holy (1986) has made the point, in a study of the Toka 
in Zambia, that people's behaviour may be at variance with such structural 
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models, but such models remain nevertheless a potent ideological form in 
society. That is also the case in Mgeta. These models may be merely 
ideological expressions, but it is significant that they remain powerful in 
people's consciousness. 
The question then arises as to why such norm complexes may be 
important artefacts in society while their relation to behaviour may be 
questionable. The point made here is that social change demands con- 
tinuous interpretation of such norm complexes. Social behaviour is a 
continuous construction of realities which cannot be caught in formal rules: 
law is a process embedded in social contexts (Moore, 1978). A court case 
is, of course, only a fraction of the social situation which creates the conflict, 
and one can argue that an article like this one should be embedded in a 
general overview of land tenure as observed to give meaning to the cases. 
Nevertheless, this article is mainly based on cases which appeared before 
Mgeta Primary Court, because court cases have great heuristic value in 
explaining society in the particular situation in Mgeta. 
Luguru local culture strongly disapproves of conflict. People will not 
deny that there are numerous conflicts about land, but they prove unwilling 
to talk about them. As mentioned above, people adhere to an ideological 
claim that land ownership originates from clan identification. The material 
presented here will show that, in the light of the facts, this is often a tenuous 
claim. Court cases offer an important opportunity to probe the reality 
behind such a claim to social conformity. 
This does not mean that the nature of land conflicts was immediately 
obvious in court cases. The courts and litigants define the conflict in formal 
terms: debates in court centre more on what happened at particular 
moments than on why things happened. The particular nature of court 
proceedings in Mgeta may best be illustrated by the way in which charges 
of the use of unacceptable language (matusi) were dealt with. Such lan- 
guage usually involves statements concerning forbidden incestuous sexual 
behaviour and may imply witchcraft allegations. These words are normally 
not repeated in court, and so one can hear long deliberations about whether 
terrible statements have been made, very carefully avoiding the actual 
words used. Court cases in such a cultural setting are, of course, valuable 
sources of information, but, in order to reveal their real meaning, cases have 
to be followed up by observation and interviews with the parties concerned. 
This was necessary not only because of the nature of court procedures, but 
also because claims on land are legitimised in normative terms which are 
often at odds with the facts. A mere interpretation of facts as presented in 
court can, therefore, hide an underlying reality.4 
MATRILINEAL DESCENT AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
Land in Mgeta is extremely fragmented. People see this as a problem, but 
they feel powerless in the face of the social forces causing the fragmenta- 
tion. These forces manifest themselves especially when land is being distri- 
buted from a deceased person's estate. All interested parties agree at the 
outset that fragmentation should be discouraged. Plots should, therefore, 
be allocated as much as possible to people who already have land in the 
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vicinity, and small plots should not be further subdivided. Disputes then 
erupt about the relative value of the plots, as the plots can differ so much 
in fertility, and the only solution is to divide the plots equally among the 
contending parties, with the result that the land is further fragmented. 
Consequently, most estate distributions leave bitter feelings. The result is 
that there are many disputes about neighbouring plots. 
The driving force behind these conflicts is, of course, scarcity of land, 
especially good land. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is a source of 
jealousy. If there is a desperate shortage of land, and a neighbouring plot 
is lying fallow, the temptation to move in is, of course, very great. Such 
tendencies can be exacerbated when neighbouring plots differ greatly in 
fertility. This is often the case, because erosion deposits fertile soil from 
higher plots onto lower ones. 
A common form of conflict is, therefore, a claim on a neighbouring plot, 
and this raises issues about the division of these plots in the past. It would 
be logical to expect stretches of land in Mgeta to be owned predominantly 
by people of one clan, because the matrilineal ideology assumes corporate 
ownership of land by people descended from a common ancestor who is 
supposed to have been the first settler of the area. However, one finds that 
adjoining plots can be farmed by people belonging to any one of a multitude 
of different clans. The matrilineal ideology may presume descent from the 
original settler of the area, but, in specific cases, actual memory of such 
descent is still alive only in some instances. People assert their clan affilia- 
tion with great certainty but are blank, vague or contradictory if one asks 
about actual patterns of descent (van Donge, 1992). 
The identification of land with particular clans is therefore often proble- 
matic. Similarly, there is often no clear connection between the clan iden- 
tity of the land at stake and the clan identities of the litigants. It may be 
claimed that the ideology of matrilineal descent is hegemonic, but, in 
practice, it indicates only partially how people come into the possession of 
land. The following case illustrates how the identities of the litigants and 
that of the land can be different in matrilineal terms. It also illustrates how 
such situations can come about. 
Criminal case 23/86, Shabaan Ali v. Kristina Medard, was about a piece 
of land farmed by Kristina Medard. One day she found her neighbour, 
Cyprian Kikoma, working on the plot and she protested. Cyprian Kikoma 
then approached Shabaan Ali, as representative of the clan, to open a case 
at the Primary Court. They claimed that both plots had originally been one 
and belonged to their clan. Kristina argued that the land belonged to the 
clan of her late husband and his matrilineal relatives, and that she had 
continued to farm it with their permission after his death. 
Shabaan Ali won the case in Mgeta Primary Court. Kristina appealed to 
the district magistrate, who decided that the case should have been opened 
not as a criminal case but as a civil one. He directed the litigants to reopen 
the dispute as a civil case at Mgeta Primary Court. Shabaan Ali then gave 
up and Kristina continues to farm the land. 
The Primary Court's judgement mentioned as the reason for deciding in 
favour of Shabaan Ali that Kristina Medard could not properly prove who 
had given her the plot.5 The transfer to her late husband had been wit- 
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nessed by his mother and his mother's sister. They were, however, no 
longer alive at the time of the case and a younger sister of her late husband 
was Kristina's witness. She was only a child at the time of the transfer and 
had not herself witnessed it. The evidence brought by Shabaan Ali was not 
particularly convincing, either. He brought an old person of uncertain 
status with respect to clan matters to testify that the whole plot had 
originally belonged to one person of Shabaan Ali and Cyprian Kikoma's 
clan. 
The case illustrates that any testimony which refers to the distant past is 
vague in a society where written records are scarce. In order to make 
problems manageable, one has to limit the collective memory of land rights. 
Structural amnesia is, therefore, a powerful force in Mgeta. The more the 
distant past is taken as a source of law in such a situation, the more insecure 
present claims on land become. 
The structure of communal land ownership is therefore not fixed but is 
continuously constructed. A fundamental reason is the inability of legal 
systems to foresee the issues that will crop up in human interaction. Social 
life can create situations which simply do not fit a legal normative system. 
This is illustrated in a string of cases fought by Isdori Patris and Bernard 
Laurens (criminal case 77/85; criminal appeal 94/86; civil case 2/86; civil 
case 3/86). They gave up only because they no longer had the resources to 
fight each other, and they accepted then the judgement of Solomon origin- 
ally given by the baraza la usalahishi (see note 1) to divide the disputed field 
in half. 
The facts of the case were not in dispute. The plot had belonged to one 
Koseni Lunghwamba, who belonged to the Mbena clan, and the land was 
also Ubena. Koseni Lunghwamba had given the plot to Antony Masese. 
Antony Masese, in turn, had given the land to his brother Laurens. Both 
were Wabena, Bernard Laurens had inherited the land from the latter, his 
father, and was farming it at the time the dispute erupted. The other party 
in the dispute, Isdori Patris, was the husband of Anna Koseni, the daughter 
of the original owner of the plot. She claimed to have inherited the plot 
from her father. 
The two opposing parties claimed, therefore, to have inherited the plot 
from their father, whose clan identity was identical to that of the land. Both 
Anna Koseni and Bernard Laurens had, of course, inherited their clan 
identity in the logic of matrilineal descent through their mothers and 
therefore belonged to clans other than that from which the land had 
originated. Consequently, matrilineal descent as such gave no guidance in 
solving the case. In addition, Anna Koseni was represented in this case by 
her husband and not by matrilineal relatives of her father, who should be 
the proper authorities in a case like this. Matrilineal affiliation is simply 
irrelevant in such a case. 
The Primary Court magistrate recognised this problem in his final 
judgement and summed up the clan identities involved: 'The shamba 
in question is Ubena, Bernhard Laurens is Mchuma, Esdore Patris is 
Mwafigwa and Anna Koseni is Mwenda.' He resorted, however, to refer- 
ring the case back to the baraza la usalahishi and, despite the fact that 
conflicts of this nature are certain to crop up time and again, he did 
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not develop perspectives which could structure decisions in future 
conflicts. 
The two cases discussed show that there are strong forces which drive 
land out of clan control: inheritance from the father and dispersal of land 
allocated on marriage after the divorce or death of a spouse. In both these 
cases, courts resorted to procedural grounds rather than face the substan- 
tive issue of law. These two cases ended not in a solution resulting from a 
confrontation of legal principles with factual situations but in both parties 
simply giving up the struggle after spending time and energy in a search for 
justice. 
A possible reaction to this situation would be individualisation of land 
tenure where people can dispose of land at will on the grounds that they are 
in possession, especially as the concept of lineage as a coherent corporate 
identity seems to have disappeared. However, claims are seldom made by 
individuals seeking individual title. Groups of people are usually in dispute 
with each other, and disputing parties are often represented by others who 
exemplify a larger unit of family or clan. Land rights in Mgeta are framed 
in terms of provisional and residual property relationships in which cor- 
porate claims play a dominant role (cf. von Benda-Beckmann, 1979: 45). 
The following case illustrates how such residual corporate groups can 
reassert their claims if people seem to dispose of land according to in- 
dividual will. 
The case concerns land which, through marriage, appears to slip out of 
clan control. Civil case 27/88, Pauline Fabian v. Stephan Joseph, involved 
land which a father had transferred to a son of a marriage which had broken 
up. Stephan Joseph's father and Pauline Fabian belong to the same clan. 
Land which was identified with this clan had been given to a brother from 
the same marriage, Paul Berege. The last-named had tra ferred it to 
Stephan Joseph. Pauline Fabian claimed the land back for the clan on the 
grounds that the marriage had been dissolved and that a relationship 
therefore no longer existed between these children and the clan. In this case 
the court asserted corporate ownership and Pauline won. 
Corporate claims are, however, also social constructions. Matrilineal 
ideology may be adhered to, but in disputes people can form alliances or 
action sets which are at odds with the rules as generally asserted. The 
corporate claims in the next two cases illustrate this. 
Civil case 4/88, Emilian Mahoe v. Pius Karoli, was a dispute about a plot 
adjacent to one owned by Emilian Mahoe. The facts of the case were not 
in dispute. Originally the plot belonged to the same clan as that to which 
Emilian Mahoe belonged. The last person who farmed the land and who 
had the same clan identity was Francis Libigwa's father. Francis Libigwa 
inherited it from him. Francis died young. His children were looked after 
by a maternal relative of Francis, Pius Karoli. Pius Karoli also farmed the 
disputed plot after the death of Francis Libigwa. Emilian Mahoe argued his 
case according to the logic of matrilineal ideology. Pius Karoli belonged to 
the same clan as Francis Libigwa, but this clan identity bore no relation to 
the land. Mahoe argued that, whereas Francis could claim the land through 
his father, no such claim could be made by Pius Karoli and that the land 
should therefore be returned to his, Emilian Mahoe's, clan. 
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This was a bitter dispute involving a string of cases and appeals. In a 
sense one cannot conclude that there was a winner or a loser, because the 
court decided that the rightful owners of the land were the children of 
Francis Libigwa. They had all moved out of the area and were working in 
Dar es Salaam. They testified that the land should be worked by their 
guardian, Pius Karoli. A corporate group thus emerges which is composed 
of the children of a father and a matrilineally related relative of the father. 
This does not fit the matrilineal ideology: the children of Francis Libigwa 
should, in the first instance, find solidarity among their mother's relatives 
instead of among their father's matrilineal relatives. One therefore sees here 
a corporate group which does not fit the logic of solidarity along matrilineal 
lines, but one does not see an assertion that land should be disposed of at 
the will of the individual who owns it. 
Civil case 8/88, Emilian Thomas v. Paolo Dominic, was a conflict among 
a group of matrilineally related people. The disputed plot was planted with 
trees by the late Gideon Mahenge. Gideon died in 1966, and the plot 
became the collective property of Gideon's matrilineal relatives. They used 
the plot for their timber requirements, and sometimes timber from the plot 
was sold. One person, Jovitt, was entrusted with the general supervision of 
the plot. The dispute arose when Jovitt allowed Paolo Dominic, a son of his 
sister, to plant beans on the plot, Paolo had felled young trees to make space 
for beans: that was unacceptable, as it could imply a completely different 
use of the plot. It would mean that the plot would move from collective to 
individual use. The other matrilineal relatives of the late Gideon then asked 
Emilian Thomas to bring an action. 
The judgement was similar to the one in the previous case: the rightful 
owners of the plot were the seven children of the late Gideon Mahenge. 
This was certainly so with respect to the trees, because trees, as distinct 
from the land on which they stand, can be inherited in direct line from a 
male. The construction which had emerged after Gideon's death was thus 
on this point at variance with the legal rules as normally accepted. Gideon's 
children sided with Emilian in the dispute and laid no claim to the land 
themselves. In this case, also, corporate ownership is a force which is not 
easily displaced by individual claims. Such corporate ownership may, 
however, be constructed in ways which differ from the hegemonic rule of 
law or kinship ideology. 
These cases illustrate how the quest for justice which results in such land 
disputes originates from below. It is not the case that legislation imposed 
from above creates conflict; the conflict emerges from the development of 
social practice. In the last three cases the courts did provide a ruling which, 
more than usually, followed principles involved in the case. It is more 
typical that no authoritatively binding decisions are made. 
A VACUUM OF AUTHORITY 
One can argue that there is nothing unusual in the situation described 
above. The construction of social life is a creative activity, and people may 
interpret and legitimise changes using an ideology. This is especially so in 
societies which are not centralised and which are loosely structured. Such 
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ideologies may give meaning to social life, but such ideological statements 
do not need to correspond to actual behaviour. It is, however, a great strain 
on society when all arbitrary behaviour is justified. The legal aspect of the 
social definition of reality usually sets the limits within which this inter- 
pretation takes place. It is not an automatic or necessary process. The legal 
expression of the social definition of reality can originate from the courts, 
and people turn to the State legal system for that reason, despite the fact 
that they cannot reasonably expect the courts to produce such legal defini- 
tions of a normative social universe. It would therefore be logical for 
semi-autonomous fields (Moore, 1978) within the local society to take over 
this function, either through the production of a group consensus or 
through local authorities outside the State sector. That is not the case in 
Mgeta, however. 
The most common legitimisation for land ownership (Table 1) is inheri- 
tance, and most land conflicts originate in inheritance disputes. The source 
of authority in executing estates is, therefore, a logical starting point from 
which to analyse this vacuum in authority. It is possible to ask the Primary 
Court to appoint an executor to an estate. Three such cases cropped up in 
Mgeta in the course of one year, all concerning the property of people who 
had moved out of the area. Inheritance issues are usually settled outside the 
State legal arena, at the pombe ya msalaba, a beer-drinking party held forty 
days after a death in order to settle all disputes relating to the deceased's 
estate. An executor is usually chosen then from among the matrilineal 
relatives of the deceased. 
Conflicts between the children of one father and one mother are com- 
mon, but do not often result in court cases. Usually, a group of matrilineal 
relatives is in dispute with the children of a deceased father. 
If a court case erupts immediately, the executor is a clear source of 
authority, but cases are brought to the court which date from much earlier 
times. It was not unusual for a case brought to court in 1988 to refer back 
to an inheritance issue in 1976. In cases concerning inheritance through the 
father's line it is important to establish when the land in dispute left the 
matriclan: this could also have taken place decades before. People who are 
appointed as executors tend to be old and may have died by the time conflict 
erupts. The case of Severin Florian v. Johanna Konstantin (civil case 5/82; 
criminal case 42/87) illustrates this. 
The land in dispute was brought into the marriage by Severin's father 
and it belonged to the father's clan (Wanyagatwa). The dispute centred on 
the decision taken at the pombe ya msalaba after the father's death. On the 
death of his mother, Severin claimed that the plot had been allocated to him 
at the pombe ya msalaba , but the Wanyagatwa claimed that his mother had 
been allowed to use it until her death; thereafter, it had to be returned to 
the Wanyagatwa. The person appointed to execute his father's estate was 
dead by the time his mother died. Consequently, there was no authoritative 
source any more. 
The result was a string of court cases, and ultimately the case reached the 
High Court. Both parties were summoned to Dar es Salaam. Johanna 
Konstantin's party had the 'luck' to meet the High Court judge in the 
district capital, Morogoro, where he was on circuit duty. When he appeared 
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at the appointed time in Dar es Salaam, Severin was informed of this and 
rushed back to Morogoro. He met the judge there but found that the case 
had already been judged in his absence in favour of Johanna Konstantin. 
Severin then gave up, although he never received a written judgement of 
the case, and it cannot be traced in the records, either. The court did 
not, therefore, act as a source of legally binding authoritative decisions 
here. The most likely explanation for the outcome of the case was that 
the Wanyagatwa had outspent Severin Florian rather than any issue 
of law. 
The case also illustrates that the formation of a group consensus impos- 
ing a dominant interpretation of the past is the ultimate source of authority 
in such a situation. Severin Florian had fought the case as a loner. He was 
the only one among his father's children to come into conflict with the 
Wanyagatwa. One of Severin's brothers even testified against him. They all 
continued to have an amicable relationship with the Wanyagatwa and, for 
example, made communal use of a plot of trees in a Nyagatwa field belong- 
ing to their father. Severin claimed that all the others had received a 
Nyagatwa plot except him. That may or may not have been true, but the 
case illustrates how group processes become dominant if the past has to be 
interpreted in the absence of written records. Selective memory or the 
dominant interpretation of the past need not be an insecure source of law 
if it is interpreted and reinforced by an independent, authoritative institu- 
tion. Such institutions were, however, absent in this case. 
It is therefore logical for individuals to try to protect themselves, through 
the use of written documents (testaments, for example), against what they 
consider as undesirable interpretations. The courts, however, are reluctant 
to admit such evidence, as it has, in their opinion, to be witnessed by all the 
parties involved. In practice this means that a will is valid only if it is 
accepted by all parties to a dispute. This makes documents like testaments 
ineffective as a means of avoiding disputes. 
A case in point is that of Canisiana Leo v. Petri Edwards (civil case 8/84). 
The accused, Petri Edwards, rented a plot from the late Honore Sengo. 
After the latter's death, the plot was inherited by his son, Juma Honore, 
who had agreed to the arrangement and allowed Petri Edwards to continue. 
Juma Honore lived in Dar es Salaam. 
Canisiana Leo represented the clan from which the plot originated and 
claimed that Honore Sengo had left a testament relating to the plot. It had 
been witnessed by the clan representative, Medard Felix, and said that 
Petri Edwards was allowed the use of the plot to grow onions. In the event 
of his putting it to different use, it had to be returned to the clan. It was 
claimed that as Petri Edwards had carrots on the plot he had lost the right 
to it. 
It took Mgeta Primary Court three years to come to a judgement. 
Procrastination and delay are usually interpreted as a sign of corruption, 
and it was said that a lot of money was involved. The unofficial explanation 
was that the case concerned an unofficial sale. Honore Sengo had, in 
agreement with his son, sold the plot but had difficulty in getting agreement 
to the sale from the clan. That was why he had written the declaration 
asserting the rights of the clan to the plot. Plots which are suitable for 
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vegetable growing are scarce and valuable in Mgeta, and this must have 
exacerbated the bitter fight. 
As usual, these circumstantial factors were ignored. Neither did the court 
pay any attention to the will, although the complainant had surrendered it 
as evidence and it was in the file. Petri Edwards won in the Primary Court, 
and Canisiana Leo appealed to the District (civil appeal 31/81). The district 
magistrate ignored the will as well and decided in favour of Petri Edwards, 
as Canisiana Leo had 'no proper relationship with the late Honore'. 
This last sentence from the judgement is significant. The crucial ques- 
tion is who has a 'proper' relationship to the deceased and to the land he or 
she worked. The courts never define that in specific terms. This vagueness 
is also reflected in their attitude towards clan ownership of land. They do 
not deny that the clan has authority over land but repeatedly repudiate 
claims of people to represent the clan. They do not subsequently define who 
the proper authorities are. This is compounded by the problem that authority 
tends to be diffuse in matrilineal societies, but especially so in Mgeta. 
Fosbrooke and Young (1960) as well as Brain (1973) identify a clear source 
of authority in land issues, the lineage head. As mentioned earlier, this 
institution had completely disappeared in Mgeta and was only vaguely 
remembered in the mid-1980s. The brother of the mother is another clearly 
identifiable source of authority in matrilineal societies, designated in 
Kiswahili as mjomba. This can be a well defined role, but in Mgeta it is 
interpreted very widely. The term can refer in Mgeta to any matrilineally 
related male and therefore qualifies an enormous number of people as 
potential sources of authority. For example: three disputes, in which matri- 
lineal relatives of a deceased man challenged his daughter's right to the 
land, erupted about different fields. Each party of matrilineally related 
people in the three disputes brought their own mjomba as a source of 
authority. 
People in Mgeta adhere to a matrilineal ideology, but, as is the case with 
all ideological constructs, this and its historical interpretation have to be 
constantly interpreted to cope with social practice as it develops. Old people 
are the main source of oral evidence, but because they are old they are a fast 
disappearing repository of witnesses. The courts are reluctant to accept 
written evidence and they avoid making authoritative interpretations of the 
legal situation. There is no clear source of authoritative interpretations in 
the clan structure. Social pressure can, in such a situation, curb greed and 
arbitrary behaviour, but it will not necessarily do so. That it may not is 
borne out in the following case, which illustrates how these various ele- 
ments result in great social insecurity. 
Antonia Mbago v. Albertina Petri, Maria Komolo and Emilian Palala 
(civil case 6/88) seemed a straightforward case. The charge was contempt 
of court because the accused had invaded a field which had been awarded 
to the complainant in a previous court case. The accused did not deny the 
invasion and the records proved that the plot had been awarded to Antonia 
Mbago. It was logical that the accused should be convicted. 
This, however, begs the question as to why the accused nevertheless did 
not accept the court's decision, and one must move at this stage beyond the 
formal argument of the case. The key person among the accused was Maria 
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Komolo; Albertina Petri was her daughter and Emilian Palala was Alber- 
tina's husband. Maria was old and her husband had died recently. The 
husband belonged to the clan of the Wanyagatwa and had brought into the 
marriage a plot which he had inherited from his mother and which was 
identified as Nyagatwa. Lucia Devis, representing the Wanyagatwa, 
claimed the plot back for the clan. Maria Komolo retaliated by claiming a 
plot in the possession of Lucia Devis belonging to Maria's clan, the 
Wang'amba. Lucia's father had farmed the plot before her and he in turn 
had inherited it from his mother, a Mng'amba. According to Luguru rules 
the plot had to be returned to the Wang'amba after Lucia's death. 
Lucia was very old and the plot was fallow. Maria Komolo therefore 
claimed it on behalf of her daughter, who was desperately short of land. 
Lucia decided not to fight for the plot herself, but incited Antonia Mbago 
-a friend and a Mng'amba-to bring a case claiming the disputed plot. 
The form of the conflict before the court was therefore different from the 
actual conflict which gave rise to it. It was originally a conflict between two 
clans and it was turned into an internal conflict of the Wang'amba. 'The 
issue of authority over allocating land within clans therefore became a 
relevant question. Antonia Mbago claimed that the plot had been promised 
to her a long time ago by her mjomba, Modest Kinole. At the time of the 
court case, Modest Kinole was already long dead. Maria Komolo brought 
as witness her mjomba, Victori Nihengula, who had allocated the disputed 
plot to her. The wajomba were quite closely related to the respective 
litigants. Modest Kinole was said to have been a brother of Antonia's 
grandmother and Victori was a brother of Maria Komolo's mother. 
Antonia and Maria were, however, very distantly related. They claimed 
only a common clan identity (ukoo tu) and did not claim any further kinship 
links (hawahusiana). The judgement of the Primary Court was in favour of 
Antonia Mbago on the grounds that she could claim a closer relationship 
to Lucia Devis's father than Maria Komolo. 
This case illustrates the situations that can arise in Mgeta owing to the 
breakdown in the construction of the social reality of matrilineal corporate 
control over land. First, the case was fuelled by envy. Lucia Devis grabbed 
a plot from Maria Komolo and the latter retaliated. The fact that Lucia had 
encouraged Antonia Mbago to fight for the land indicates that the aim of 
the case was, in the first place, to prevent Maria owning the plot and that 
Lucia must have already given up hope of retaining it. Lucia Devis was, 
within Luguru matrilineal ideology, on weak ground. Her claim to the plot 
which belonged to Maria's late husband was based on the claim of corporate 
ownership of the matrilineal clan. Maria's claim on the plot Lucia had 
inherited from her father was based on the same principle. Lucia's claim on 
the land which was farmed by Maria was flawed, as, under Luguru rules, 
land can be inherited in the male line for one generation. Accordingly, 
Maria's daughter, Albertina Petri, had a right to inherit the plot. Lucia was 
therefore in a much weaker position to challenge ownership of the land than 
Antonia Mbago. Second, the reconstruction of the past became a major 
issue. The plot had been in the ownership of Lucia Devis and her father for 
a long time. Lucia was very old at the time of the case; 1945 was mentioned 
as the year in which Modest Kinole had pronounced on the ownership of 
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the plot. The absence of living witnesses and written records made a 
reliable reconstruction of such a distant past virtually impossible. The 
court refused to reach a decision as to who could legally represent the clan 
and found a way out by looking at the kinship relations between the last 
Mng'amba owner of the plot and the contending parties. 
In this case the weak were defeated by the strong. Albertina Petri and 
Maria Komolo were poor and did not have the money for an appeal, 
although they utterly rejected the decision. They resorted, therefore, to 
contempt of court and were then faced with a conviction and a stiff fine. 
They subsequently thought they might as well appeal after all, but the term 
within which they could appeal against the judgement in the original case 
had lapsed. In the contempt of court case an appeal stood no chance. 
Yet this case cannot be reduced to a mere morphology of struggle in 
which the weak are outspent by the rich. The legal universe described here 
is a threat to any established position, whether it is a position of wealth or 
one of poverty. Inherent in the ideology is that claims to ownership may be 
widespread among many people. Kinship and claims on land are a con- 
structed reality, and structural amnesia is in this an essential aspect of 
kinship. If, as in this case, close relationship to a previous owner is a 
legitimate reason to challenge ownership of land, many opportunities are 
opened to challenge land ownership. Legal insecurity may arise for many 
people, rich or poor. As there are no clearly identified authoritative sources 
of law on such issues, the risk of being drawn into court cases about land 
is a threat to everyone. 
INDIVIDUAL TITLE AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 
The perspective on African law presented hitherto is similar to other 
current writing on the subject. African law is less and less seen as 'custo- 
mary' law which is a product of tradition, and more and more as construc- 
ted by social forces interpreting and changing what is tradition and custom 
(e.g. Cheater, 1987, 1990). Such a position leads logically to the question 
of who interprets the law and whose interests are served by which inter- 
pretation. Mackenzie (1990), for example, argued in the case of Murang'a 
district, Kenya, that legal reality is constructed and appropriated in rela- 
tions of class and gender. 
Gender is not an issue in land disputes in Mgeta. The case did not show 
clear patterns of gender relations; they are as likely to be inter-gender as 
intra-gender. In the groups that mobilise in land disputes one finds often 
a mixture of male and female. Class seems at first sight more important. 
Land disputes may be framed in terms of kinship and corporate descent 
groups, but money is an aspect of all cases. It is often mentioned in court 
as a subsidiary factor, but money is a prerequisite to fight a land case in 
court. It is also clear from the cases that social life in the area is encapsulated 
in wider exchange networks through, for example, migration or the vege- 
table trade (van Donge, 1992). Commoditisation, in the sense of the struc- 
turing of social relations by exchange relations based upon money, is 
therefore undoubtedly an aspect of life in Mgeta. 
Snyder (1981), following Bernstein (1977), argues in his study of legal 
209 
LAND CONFLICTS IN TANZANIA 
change among the Banjal, Senegal, that in contemporary Africa 'the 
reproduction of all forms of production depends ultimately upon capitalist 
commodity relations'. A logical consequence of such a perspective is to see 
legal disputes as expressions of such relations, which are by definition 
antagonistic. There do not seem, however, to be any grounds on which to 
reduce the land disputes in Mgeta to expressions of antagonistic capitalist 
commodity relations.6 
The spread of monetary values in Mgeta is not associated with the rise 
of an emerging bourgeoisie exploiting an increasingly impoverished mass 
(van Donge, 1992). Some people are undoubtedly wealthier than others, 
but that does not structure the nature of land conflicts. As a rule, one does 
not find economic inequality between parties engaged in conflict. It is more 
typical that the two parties locked in dispute cannot be clearly differentiated 
economically. They will try to mobilise resources in as big a group as 
possible, but the dispute is fought at great cost to both.7 Land disputes are 
definitely not seen in local wisdom as an instrument for accumulation. Long 
and expensive litigation about land ownership, without much hope of a 
resolution of the conflict in the State legal arena, is a dominant feature of 
life. The folk moral in Mgeta of a court case is that in the end everybody 
is worse off. 
One can therefore not see a hidden logic of exploitation, accumulation 
and class differentiation resulting from commoditisation as an underlying 
pattern in these cases. Also, only two of the thirty-one land cases before the 
courts in this study resulted from an outright sale of land. It is probable that 
commercial transactions in land are much more widespread than this 
suggests (see the case of Canisiana Leo v. Petri Edwards, above), but 
purchase is not a particularly useful way to legitimate a claim on land. It is 
accepted in court appearances as well as in day-to-day legal consciousness 
in Mgeta that commercial ownership of land gives a right to dispose of land 
at individual will. The case material shows, however, that in practice such 
a claim still has to be legitimated with corporate groups. One of the major 
reasons is, again, that evidence is to such a great extent a social construction 
in a society where literacy is weak and written records are of minor impor- 
tance, as is illustrated in the following case. 
The dispute in the series of cases which opened with criminal case 77/86 
Venance Mkungo v. Albert Mbago, John Kazao, Gaitan John, before Mgeta 
Primary Court was about half an acre of land. It was brought when Venance 
Mkungo found the accused building a house on the plot. The house was for 
Albert Mbago and the other two were helping him. John Kazao is married 
to a sister of Mbago's wife and Gaitan John is his son. Charges against the 
latter two were dropped at the first hearing. Albert Mbago claimed to have 
bought the land from Rashidi Maghati. 
The neighbouring plot was inherited by Venance Mkungo's wife from 
Rashidi Maghati, and Venance claimed that she had inherited the whole 
plot. 
The Primary Court accepted the case as one of forced entry and destruc- 
tion of property on November 1986. On 6 July 1987 the court came to a 
judgement after hearing the case in a total of eleven sessions. Venance 
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Mkungo won the case, as he was considered to have presented better 
evidence. 
Albert Mbago appealed to the district magistrate in Morogoro on the 
grounds that he had paid the Primary Court magistrate for a visit (which 
never took place) by the court to the disputed plot. The district magistrate 
refused to give judgement as to the ownership of the plot. The Primary 
Court had made a procedural mistake: the case should never have been 
accepted as a criminal case, only as a civil one (criminal appeal 63/87). 
Albert Mbago then initiated a civil action against Venance Mkungo (civil 
case 5/87) on 23 October 1987. The court convened a total of fourteen 
sessions to deal with the case. In four of these, one of the parties or their 
witnesses did not turn up, and, once, the scheduled judgement was delayed 
without reason. Albert Mbago won, because his evidence was considered 
much better than that of Venance Mkungo. 
Venance Mkungo then appealed to the district magistrate (civil appeal 
28/88). The district magistrate again refused to arrive at a judgement as to 
who owned the plot. He argued that, as the wife of Venance Mkungo owned 
the plot, she should have initiated the case. 
She did not take up a case, however, but Albert Mbago brought one 
against her (civil case 17/88; Albert Mbago v. Sesilia Cosmas). It was still in 
dispute when I left Mgeta in July 1989. 
The case shows clearly how the litigants become involved in a dispute 
which bears no relationship to capital accumulation. It deals with a tiny 
piece of land. Both are faced with a legal system where they are pawns in 
a game instead of players with a clear chance of winning. The courts have 
used many procedural means to avoid coming to a decision. For example, 
in addition to the general directive to open a civil case, the district magis- 
trate could have indicated at the time of the first appeal that Venance's wife 
was the affected party and therefore the appropriate person to initiate 
proceedings. The litigants are locked in protracted battle and can have little 
hope of a clear direction from the court. 
The quality of the evidence is crucial in reaching a judgement, but there 
are no guidelines as to what makes some evidence more reliable than other 
evidence. Albert Mbago cited as evidence mere facts of possession. He had 
built a beer shop on the plot and had planted a sisal fence between the 
neighbouring plots. He claimed that a written document had existed but 
had been destroyed in a fire. Even if it had been produced, the courts could 
have easily cast doubt on its validity by insisting on proper witnessing and 
form. It is easy to suggest forgery when confronted with such documents, 
which are often scraps of paper. 
Sales of clan land have to be properly witnessed by representatives of the 
clan claiming to own the land. Therefore claims on land which is bought 
and held on individual title has in practice often to be legitimated by the 
corporate group from which it came. The more time passes, the more such 
claims become a construction of reality. Even the date of the sale of the plot 
was in doubt in this case (1950? 1968? 1970?). The owner of the plot died 
in 1982 and none of the people mentioned as witnesses was still alive. In 
such cases of individual title, therefore, legal claims are as much a process 
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of social construction as in those made on the basis of kinship and mem- 
bership of corporate groups. 
The legal status of land can be transformed as it is transferred in a 
network of social relations. The following case illustrates this. The case did 
not reach Mgeta Primary Court but was brought before the baraza la 
usalahishi of Tchenzema in May 1989. 
The origin of the plot in dispute in the case of Lea Ramadhani v. Skola 
Mbegu was beyond doubt. The case actually related to two neighbouring 
plots which had originally been a single plot, owned by one Ngulumbi. 
Ngulumbi had divided the plot in half and sold the halves to two people. 
One of the plots is now farmed by Lea Ramadhani, the other by Skola 
Mbegu. 
Lea Ramadhani had inherited her undisputed half of the plot from her 
mother's mother, Sara. The plot was a gift to Sara from Sara's mother's 
brother. The latter had inherited it from the person who had bought the 
plot from Ngulumbi. It had thus been transferred in the last two instances 
according to the principles of matrilineal succession. 
Sara, Lea Ramadhani's maternal grandmother, was the person who had 
bought the other half of the plot from Ngulumbi. Sara had, during her 
lifetime, given this plot to her brother. The brother had given it to Skola 
Mbegu. Lea Ramadhani argued that, as she had inherited the neighbouring 
plot from Sara, she should also inherit this one. 
Both parties belong to the same clan, but, although Lea Ramadhani is 
directly related to Sara in the female line, such was not the case with Skola 
Mbegu. The noteworthy point of this dispute is, however, that clan author- 
ity over land was not in doubt and the baraza la usalahishi referred the 
matter to clan elders. The idea that commercially acquired land can be 
disposed of at will by the owner, irrespective of corporate claims of clans, 
was not entertained. Lea's own plot had also through inheritance effectively 
become clan property. 
Virtually all the cases presented here show that allegiance to corporate 
groups continues to provide claims on land, even if through circumstances 
of marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc., ownership has changed in character. 
That is also the case with the sale of land. The following case shows this in 
a clear and unambiguous form. 
Civil case 12/88, Pauline Binti Mkimbu v. Mattias Emil, was a dispute 
about a plot which Pauline had given to her daughter's son, Mattias Emil. 
The litigants and the plot had therefore the same clan identity. Emil sold 
the plot, however, to somebody outside the clan and Pauline claimed the 
land back. She brought a matrilineally related witness and produced a 
written document to the effect that the land had been allocated to her on the 
basis of clan affiliation. Pauline won, and the court asserted, therefore, the 
corporate ownership of the clan. 
This case material shows, therefore, that one cannot speak in Mgeta of 
a clear distinction between a form of modern, individual or commoditised 
land tenure and traditional, corporate or pre-capitalist forms of land 
ownership.8 The former forms have no meaning outside the context of the 
latter. Such claims have also to be socially constructed; but this process can 
also break down, so that no legal authoritative definition emerges. 
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CONCLUSION 
The general perspective on law presented here as a process of social defini- 
tion interpreting and developing new forms in society may be universally 
applicable. These land disputes in Mgeta show, however, that the emer- 
gence of legal forms is not an automatic process. The cases illustrate a 
breakdown in the legal definition of the social construction of reality. 
Group consensus in semi-autonomous fields does not produce such defini- 
tions; there are no clear local sources of authoritatively binding decisions, 
and people therefore have recourse to the State legal system. Long and 
expensive court cases which do not lead to binding decisions based on 
authoritative definitions of the social construction of reality ensue. The 
result is great insecurity, as people can become entangled in wasteful 
disputes which deplete resources. 
The analysis adopted here stresses the construction of social reality by 
actors and illustrates how the need for such a construction originates from 
below. It avoids, therefore, the assumption of a necessary teleology or 
deterministic biases which stem from grand social theories, e.g. com- 
moditisation or modernisation. For example, the material presented here 
does not show a predictable development towards individual title. A recent 
ambitious economic study of Tanzania referred to 'truncated factor 
markets' in the case of land, implying that a removal of legal constraints 
imposed through government would lead to the commoditisation of land 
(Bevan et al., 1990; 46). On the basis of the present material there is no 
reason for assuming this to be so. There are elements of commoditisation 
in land tenure, but there is an equally strong trend towards the decom- 
moditisation of land which has been bought by bringing it under some form 
of corporate control. 
Phenomena which are considered essential for commoditisation or 
modernisation are present in Mgeta. These are inescapable forces. Money 
is a pervasive aspect of social life and individualism is a strong force (van 
Donge, 1992). Money and migration are also aspects of many of the cases 
described here. There are, however, many ways in which people can 
respond to such forces: they are not, in themselves, determining factors in 
social behaviour. Responses to these changes can take many legal forms, as 
examples from elsewhere in Africa illustrate. For example, cocoa farmers 
in Cote d'Ivoire adopted individual title to land (Hecht, 1985), while in a 
Nigerian area which is not dissimilar corporate land tenure appeared to be 
resilient in the face of nationalisation (Francis, 1984). 
Nor does a review of the wider literature provide an explanation for the 
breakdown of the social definition of reality in Mgeta in terms of an 
inability of the 'traditional' legal system, matriliny, to cope with the new 
forms of exchange.9 An institution like the matrilineal clan can have a social 
meaning in many different circumstances (Douglas, 1969). As in Mgeta, 
von Benda-Beckmann (1979) found the matrilineal ideology persisting 
among the Minangkabau in Indonesia, but people had adapted to the 
growth of individualism and monetary relationships by pawning. An 
explanation which interprets this need for the social construction of reality 
as a cultural lag between matrilineal systems and modernisation/ 
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commoditisation does not, therefore, hold. However, corporate forms of 
land tenure such as those found in Mgeta do not necessarily adapt har- 
moniously to social change. That may be the case, as Francis (1984) has, for 
example, shown to be the situation in Nigeria. Chanock (1985) correctly 
argues, however, not only that there is an ideological argument depicting 
African legal systems as impediments to change, but also that these have 
been idealised. The material presented here shows that legal conflicts do 
not automatically lead towards some form of homeostasis where new power 
relationships are crystallised. 
The puzzling aspect of these disputes in Mgeta remains that rational 
choice considerations do not seem to be applicable. No obvious interests 
seem to be served by these disputes, which lead only to entropy: a depletion 
of resources. Foster (1972) has argued that envy is a pan-human emotion 
which is abundantly present in every society. This reflects exactly the 
nature of these conflicts. 'It is important to note that an envier is not 
envious of the thing he would like to have; he is envious of the person who 
is fortunate enough to have it. The possession is the trigger, but not the 
target, of envy' (p. 168). It is also a particularly dangerous and destructive 
emotion, and society therefore devises many mechanisms to bridle its force. 
Foster describes merely symbolic behaviour as envy-reducing mechanisms, 
but the authoritative pronouncement of law is of course an obvious 
mechanism for controlling envy as well. 
Unbridled envy is one important causal factor of these wasteful and 
unnecessary court cases, but it is also true that people long for justice. A 
stated motivation for continuing very costly and wasteful court cases is the 
fear that people will take the law into their own hands. The fear of the 
consequences of envy can be seen clearly there, and one should not belittle 
the many attempts made. A semi-autonomous field of law (Moore, 1978) 
exists: many conflicts do not reach the State legal arena but are settled 
within the community. This does not, however, resolve the breakdown in 
the social construction of reality as embodied in law. The disruptive force 
of envy can therefore manifest itself in land disputes which the force of law 
does not control. 
NOTES 
1 The Primary Court is the lowest specialised judicial organ of the Tanzanian State. The 
Primary Court magistrate, who has a basic specialist education in law, hears cases with two 
lay assessors, and judgements must be majority decisions. The lay assessors are supposed to 
provide specific local expertise on legal matters. As a rule Primary Court magistrates come 
from outside the area. They claim, however, familiarity with local legal ideas, and I have no 
reason to doubt that. The party structure has a veto on the appointment of the assessors, but 
I found no indication that these latter represent specific local interests. Many land disputes 
come before the courts. I made a detailed record of all cases before Mgeta Primary Court in 
the period 12 May 1987 to 28 June 1988. The total number of cases was 142, thirty-two of 
which were land disputes. There is, however, ample opportunity to resolve disputes without 
recourse to the Primary Court because it is only one of the legal arenas in Mgeta. People can 
bring cases directly there, but in the main they turn first to the neighbourhood leader (leader 
of the local party cell, balozi). Neighbourhoods are subdivisions of villages, and most villages 
have a reconciliation council (baraza la usalahishi) to mediate in local conflicts. If that fails, 
people can turn to the ward secretary (katibu kata), who is a combined party and government 
appointee at ward level, the next level above the village. The division (tarafa) is the level above 
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the ward and the level at which the Primary Court functions. The court sometimes relegates 
matters to lower authorities, e.g. the reconciliation council, if people have not made enough 
effort to sort matters out among themselves. Often there is pressure on litigants to withdraw 
cases brought in the Primary Court and to attempt to settle the matter informally. 
2 People in Mgeta live mostly in clusters perched on mountain ranges and these are 
designated by specific names. The surveys covered nine such neighbourhoods in three dif- 
ferent wards. There did not appear, however, to be any significant differences between the 
three different environments. This subdivision in communities should be distinguished from 
administrative subdivisions. The lowest unit of government is the ten-house party cell. Mgeta 
division, like all of Tanzania, is administratively subdivided into villages and wards. These 
administrative subdivisions do not, however, refer to communities, as the whole area is 
densely populated and people will designate themselves in the first place as belonging to these 
informal hamlets (van Donge, 1992). 
3 During my research in Mgeta I encountered only one person who had been designated 
a lineage head in the way described by Fosbrooke and Young (1960): Mr Nassoro Uhadi in 
Mizugu. It may be that their and Brain's (1973) description of the lineage head is a reification, 
just as their detailed description of lineage terminology may be. P. C. Duff, a long-serving 
administrative officer in the area, wrote: 'On the general reliability of evidence based on clan 
genealogies, I found over a period of six years of hearing land appeal cases ... that when lucky 
enough to arive at the correct sequence of clan heads . . . then the general buzz of approval 
from a large audience representing both sides of the dispute left one in no doubt that this was 
the true position' (personal communication, 22 June 1987). 4 It may be useful to make clear how difficult it was to gather this material. The then serving 
Primary Court magistrate was originally willing to explain land cases himself only from 
records in front of him. After clearance with the district magistrate, I got formal permission 
to research land disputes at Mgeta Primary Court. I could not continuously attend court in 
Mgeta, as I was employed as a lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam, so I paid one of 
the court clerks to make a record of all appearances before the court and I discussed these with 
him at three-monthly intervals. I then built up trust and was allowed to read case records 
myself. This revealed significant discrepancies between the stories as presented to me and 
what I read. Then I followed these up with visits to the litigants. As a rule, only one of the 
two parties involved was willing to talk to me. I then checked these versions with people whom 
I got to know in the community. This phase of the research was not rounded off until August 
1989. In the course of my research I came to know about many more land conflicts. If these 
had been resolved in successful reconciliation, people flatly refused to talk about them. 
5 The written judgement as I found it in the court records was different from the oral 
presentation of the judgement according to Kristina Medard. The Primary Court magistrate 
stated then that Kristina's argument may have been stronger, but that she lost because she had 
not paid the court enough respect (heshima). Respect, according to her, meant money. The 
possibility of arbitrary action in the State arena is virtually always an aspect of these cases. 
6 The perspective of this article, which sees commodity relations as an aspect of legal 
development that people can incorporate into their constructions of social reality, is not at 
variance with the empirical material as presented by Snyder. For example, see his elegant case 
material on pp. 230-8. Commoditisation does not necessarily lead to a unilinearly determined 
path of development. For example, on p. 222 Snyder writes about 'different mechanisms, 
changing forms and uneven penetration of commodity relations'. 
7 If one asks people about how much court cases have cost them, they mention staggering 
amounts: one wonders how such sums could be raised in a society which shows so little visible 
differentiation in wealth. It is said that much money acquired illegally (e.g. through the 
transport of elephant tusks, illegal cutting of hardwoods or emerald mining) is used in these 
cases. 
8 In his study of land tenure among the Mbeere of Kenya, Glazier (1985) similarly 
describes a process of social construction in which various ideologies of land tenure are 
intertwined. 'My initial question is: Why do the Mbeere find descent constructs the appro- 
priate idiom for representing the social organisation of land tenure before land reform when 
such constructs only partially image the actual group of claimants the ideology purports to 
explain?... Secondly, why don't people simply organize themselves as an interest group 
without taking pains either to record official genealogies or to articulate to each other and to 
the government their land claims through the primordial symbol of descent?' (p. 277). 'The 
solidarity and cooperation within groups designated "clans" is no less essential than in earlier 
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days, although these values are now borne as much by contractual and monetary concerns as 
by the diffuse symbolism of descent ideology' (p. 281). The situation in Mgeta differs 
essentially from the one in Mbeere, as there has not been an active government policy in 
Tanzania of introducing contractual and monetary elements into land tenure. 9 It has been strongly argued that pressures towards particular social forms stem from 
particular systems of agriculture, but that still leaves ample scope for the social construction 
of diverse realities. Goody (1976), for example, has suggested strong links between land 
scarcity and inheritance of property: 'I suggest that the scarcer productive resources become, 
and the more intensively they are used, then the greater the tendency towards the retention 
of those resources within the basic productive and reproductive unit, which in the majority 
of cases is the nuclear family' (p. 20). According to him, in Africa, land was relatively 
abundant, and political domination depended therefore more on gathering followers than on 
the retention of land. Succession is, in such a situation, more important than inheritance. If 
one accepts this as a typical situation, then the Waluguru are exceptional. Political authority 
among the Waluguru has always been decentralised, but, according to available accounts, it 
depended in the first place on control over land. In addition, land has long been scarce. In 
ideological terms, however, land was not meant to be inherited strictly in the basic productive 
and reproductive unit. Goody contrasts the African situation with the Asian one, where 
pressure on land is widespread. However, in Minangkabau, where land is also scarce, von 
Benda-Beckmann (1979) also found a persistence of 'provision and residual property relation- 
ships in which corporate claims play a dominant role' (p. 45). 
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Abstract 
This article explains why people in Mgeta become locked in long and expensive land 
disputes. These disputes cannot be explained as rational choice strategies: the value 
of the land involved bears no relation to the costs people claim to incur: and people 
have recourse to the State legal arena without any reasonable expectation of a 
resolution of the conflict there. The explanation offered here is that there is a 
breakdown in the social definition of reality. The quest for justice is seen as a legal 
expression of a search for such definition. 
The Waluguru reason about land mainly in terms of a matrilineal ideology. This 
ideology is not, however, an ahistorical identity which gives automatic answers in 
disputes; it has to be continuously constructed as society copes with social change. 
The problem cannot be seen as one of cultural lag, where modern forms of law clash 
with older forms. Case material shows that recourse to individual title, for example, 
requires as much social construction of reality as recourse to Luguru systems of law. It 
also shows that these forms of law are inextricably intertwined. The failure to express 
a social construction of reality which is experienced as authoritative and binding is 
exacerbated by a vacuum of authority which has emerged in Luguru society. 
The obvious force driving these seemingly irrational conflicts is envy. In a 
situation, as here, where there is a breakdown in the social construction of reality 
and where a vacuum of authority exists, this disruptive force can manifest itself in 
unbridled form. 
Resume 
Cet article explique pourquoi les populations de Mgeta se trouvent enfermees en de 
longues et onereuses querelles concernant la terre. Ces querelles ne peuvent etre 
analysees comme des strategies de choix rationnel: la valeur de la terre en cause n'a 
aucun rapport avec les frais que les personnes concernmes pretendent encourir; et 
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ces gens ont recours aux instances legales sans en attendre la moindre solution 
raisonnable a leurs conflits. L'explication fournie dans l'article est qu'il y a un 
ecroulement de la definition sociale de la realite. La recherche de justice est con- 
sideree comme une expression legale de la recherche d'une telle d&finition. 
Les Waluguru, en ce qui concerne la terre, raisonnent en termes d'ideologie 
matrimoniale. Toutefois, cette ideologie ne constitue pas une identite historique qui 
fournit des reponses automatiques en cas de querelle, elle doit se construire con- 
tinuellement au fur et a mesure que la societe subit des changements sociaux. Le 
probleme ne peut etre vu comme celui d'un retard culturel, ou des formes modernes 
de loi entreraient en conflit avec des formes plus anciennes. L'analyse des cas en 
cause montre par exemple que le recours a un titre individuel exige autant de 
construction sociale de la r&alite que le secours aux systemes des lois Luguru. Elles 
demontre aussi que ces formes de loi sont inextricablement emmelees. L'echec de 
l'expression d'une construction sociale de la realite, qui est ressentie comme autori- 
taire et contraignante, est exacerbe par une vacance de l'autorit& qui a emerge dans 
la soci&et Luguru. 
La force manifeste qui conduit a ces conflits apparemment irrationnels est l'envie. 
Dans une situation telle que celle-ci, oui se manifeste une debacle de la construction 
sociale de la realite tandis qu'existe un manque d'autorite, une telle force disruptive 
peut se reveler sous une forme debridee. 
